AChinese viewpoint
By Ni Lexiong

Fifty years have elapsed since the Korean War, which broke out in 1950. Nonetheless, it is still very difficult to uncover all the truths, realize its significance and learn its lessons; rather, it is simply impossible. The political geography in Northeast Asia and part of the present world situation are the outcome of the Korean War. The significance and impact of the war are still unfolding.

The findings in any ongoing research are only but a small part of the total significance of the Korean War. In view of this, it is relatively easy to unearth some truths, while the discussion of the significance of the experiences and its lessons are very difficult to deal with.

On the justice of the Korean War

In researching the Korean War, Chinese scholars have been very often entangled in the trammels of ethics, and to make an ethical evaluation of wars has been the tradition of the Chinese nation. This has become the cultural subconscious of Chinese scholars, which often leads researchers to a narrow "right and wrong" terrain, from which they find no way out. Inevitably, they would attempt to find out "who fired the first shot", "who launched the attack first", and "who was the invader"? The research has unconsciously become a purely ethical evaluation, and much more important aspects have been totally ignored.

When the pursuit of interests does not contradict, but rather conforms to the principle of morality and justice, the fuse of wars is most easily ignited. In a civilized society in particular, it has become a necessity for every group to find some excuses for the war they plunge into. Even so, morality and justice are nothing but the "back-drop" for wars, rather than the goal.

Kim Il-sung and Syngman Rhee, then president of South Korea, had both been obsessed with the idea of dealing with the issue of unification by means of war. Yet, if national unification was the just claim of the Korean nation, then Kim and Rhee were the incarnation of this just claim. We cannot say that unification as seen from one side is just and from the other is unjust. If we go a little further to specify the standard of justice and say that it is just to carry out unification through peaceful means and unjust through violent means, viewed from their motivations, the two parties were ready to resort to force from the very beginning.

In terms of the origins and characteristics of the political groups represented by Kim and Rhee, both associated anti-Japanese conquest with violence, from which their personal and group experiences convinced them that violence was the only solution to the problem, a conviction that went well with the logic of both parties.

The difference was that the Soviet Union provided Kim Il-sung with offensive weapons, ie 150 T-34 tanks, the most advanced tanks at that time, that helped the Soviet Union to achieve its victory in the war against Germany. Later these tanks were used by the North Korean troops as vanguard and swept away all obstacles on their path. The United States, considering that the trouble on the Korean peninsula might detract its energies in Europe, refused to provide South Korea with offensive weapons, which included tanks, on the pretext that the terrain on the Korean Peninsula was unfavorable for mechanical military operations.

Suppose that weapon provisions had been reversed on the two sides, it might have been South Korea invading North Korea first. So it is meaningless to investigate who first started the war. Here we discovered that the "right or wrong" judgments in morality and justice could not be made without putting the facts in context. As far as Kim Il-sung was concerned, his actions conformed to his motivations, while due to the limitation of the objective conditions, Syngman Rhee had the motivation but found no means to put it into practice.

The difference between the two was no more than this. Later, when the South Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel, the only difference disappeared with it. Thus it can be seen that neither were willing to move behind the 38th parallel. At that time, however, when people made the judgment of right and wrong on the Korean conflict, the specific yardsticks of justice were the clauses in the Yalta Agreement and Potsdam Treaty.

If the unification of the Korean nation underlay the justice and legality of the war for both North and South Korea, where did the justice and legality of the involvement of China, the United States and Soviet Union lie? Although every belligerent was turning over their own interests in their minds, war would have been out of the question had it not been disguised with justice in a civilized society. Consequently it was compulsory to look for proof of the justice of the war; in fact, acknowledged principles of justice could always be found to suit their purposes, directly or indirectly. The US took as the principle of justice to maintain the Yalta peace system after World War II. The Soviet Union took the communist ideal that sought liberation for all human beings; and besides the communist ideal, China laid much stress on the principle of justice for maintaining state security.

Thus it can be seen that in different states and nations justice had different contents and the specific principles of justice often conflicted with each other. Kim Il-sung's principle of justice to achieve national unification conflicted with the principle of justice of Yalta. Stalin's communist principle to achieve the glorious ideal of human beings too conflicted with the principle of justice of Yalta. While the actions of the United States were complicated - South of the 38th parallel, it represented the principle of justice of Yalta, while crossing the 38th parallel represented the conflict between the principle of justice of the free world, of Yalta and of communism.

Not crossing the 38th for China represented the principles of justice, maintaining state safety, and loyalty to friends, communism and Yalta all rolled into one; and by crossing the 38th parallel, conflict with the Yalta principle of justice would arise. Therefore, in terms of ethics, the Korean war was a conflict between various principles of justice, and the principles of justice of each party presupposed the negation of the opposite party. Thus the Korean war was a tragedy in seeking principles of justice as well as seeking national interests.

The evaluation of interests of the Korean War

There have been several defects in past Chinese research on the Korean war. Ethical judgment was frequently, yet unconsciously, mixed with the evaluation of interests in the discussion. Only the positive effects of various kinds of actions were discussed, while the negative effects were not discussed or not allowed to be discussed; and too much attention had been put on morality and justice, while the systematic investigation into the losses and gains of the belligerent parties were neglected.

In analyzing the Korean war, the evaluation of interests is far more important than morality and justice. The latter cannot substitute the former, while the former should avoid the interference of the latter as much as possible.

For South as well as North Korea, since both resumed the original place at the 38th parallel, the two parties gained nothing but a loss of people and financial resources, the aggravation of hatred and the postponement of the national unification. In the camps they were in, the two parties of South and North were only bargaining chips in the diplomatic game played by the great powers. Therefore, the risks and responsibilities were their own, while the potential benefits were just proportionate to their role in the larger scheme.

In the end, the national disruption suffered by both parties was too heavy a price. The United States gained the following benefits: in terms of global strategic disposition, it stationed troops in South Korea again and advanced its strategic front to the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Strait. In terms of ideological antagonism, the United States stopped communism, seen as a fierce flood and a savage beast, far from its own gate. Its participation in the war was also a strong psychological support to those capitalist countries in Southeast Asia, which fell back on the United States, by means of which the United States expanded its influence in the region.

Viewed from the perspective of the communist cause, it was a failure for the Soviet Union, for it viewed the setbacks of other socialist countries as its own. In terms of the national interests from a narrow sense, however, the Soviet Union got the lion's share, with a depleted American force and the easing of pressure in Europe. What is more, the modern weapons used to equip 60 divisions and planes were well paid by China.

From the start of the Korean War, the US 7th Fleet sailed to the Taiwan Strait, a direct confrontation with China, which resulted in irredeemable damage to the Sino-American relation.

The division of China was objectively advantageous to the national security of the Soviet Union. In fact, China and North Korea became the cat's paws, maintaining the national interests of the Soviet Union without an iota of remuneration. The Soviet Union made big profits without making any investment.

It is very difficult to make an accurate analysis of Chinese losses and gains in the Korean War. The war had both elements of the communist campaign and of national interests, and the evaluation standards of the two were totally different, sometimes even opposite. Good to the former might not be good, sometimes even harmful, to the latter, and vice versa. By adopting the perspective of the global interests of the socialist family, China was so loyal to its friend in need to risk its own integrity by rushing to defend the Korean allies even when in disruption, suffering from the scars for 20-odd years of war with a poorly equipped army.

China was like a badly wounded soldier who rushed to fight again to save his companions when he should have retreated. Following the logic of socialist internationalism to the extreme, a war fiasco for a socialist country was worth it for the sake of the great communist cause.

But later it was discovered that the ideals of some countries were not so noble. They even made use of the name of socialism to serve their own country's interests, which resulted in the final disintegration of the European socialist camp, and once again, the traditional evaluation standard of national interests was resumed.

In this case, just as in life, those who are too loyal to their buddies suffer the heaviest losses. To risk one's life and fend off the sword thrust against a friend, one gets stabbed by the sword of both the enemy and the friend. Thus, today when we evaluate the diplomatic experiences and lessons from the point of view of national interests, we have to consider the advantages and disadvantages, gains and losses of our country in the war.

Considering national interests, the objective situation and the judgment of the decision-makers, it was advisable to resist the US aggression and help Korea. In crisis, when decision-makers come to a decision, they tend to consider dealing with the worst case scenario: it was better to stop the threat from Korea at the 38th parallel, which suppressed the desire of an invasion in the direction of Taiwan. Had the choice been different, foreign invading forces would have conquered the whole Korean peninsula and then invaded mainland China. Viewed purely from the perspective of national security, this strategic consideration was no doubt advisable, as then proven by facts.

In the Korean War, the former Soviet Union equipped 60 (some say 100) Chinese divisions, helped our country to rapidly establish an air force with a quite strong fighting capacity, which improved the combat effectiveness of our army.

Considering long-term national interests, participation in the Korean War eased the pressure of the Soviet bloc in Europe and enhanced trust between China and the USSR. As a reward, the Soviet Union provided our country with a large amount of aid, which exerted inestimable influence on the recovery of our country's economy and its future development. Although the relationship between China and the Soviet Union worsened later and we tried our best to diminish the significance of assistance from the Soviet Union, the objective influence of aid were an indelible truth. Now some thought that we suffered too much, having been the cannon fodder for the Soviet Union - a side effect of underestimating USSR aid. In fact, Soviet aid had no historical comparison and was more copious than US aid during the anti-Japanese war. Comparing the political deals between countries, Mao Zedong gained much more in the deal with the Soviet Union than Chiang Kai-shek from the deal with the US.

Another great consequence of the Korean war was that China completely removed the threat of foreign invasion that had lasted for over 100 years. Since the Opium War, China was defeated time and again in wars with Western powers, which caused the permeation of the dread of being subjugated. The crisis of national security reached its apex in the 1930s with the invasion of Japanese capitalists. If the war had not developed to the scale of a worldwide anti-fascist war with China, America, Britain and the Soviet Union allied to fight against Japan, but only a war between China and Japan, the result would not have been optimistic at all.

At least, it was impossible to make Japan accept unconditional surrender relying solely on China's force. The victory in the anti-Japanese war eased the countrymen's dread of being subjugated, and China ranked as one of the four big powers in the world. The status of China as one of the four big powers had not been very convincing, however. The Yalta Conference, at which the postwar interests were divided, was held without China. The Soviet Union demanded forcibly the independence of outer Mongolia so that a buffer belt was established between China and the Soviet Union, which explained all. This was the same as when World War I was over, the Versailles Treaty ruled that the leased territory of Germany in Shandong province was passed over to Japan. It was rare in world history that the victorious nation gained less but lost more land (though Taiwan was recovered). It can be seen from this how weak China was - even if one of the four big powers! Although the anti-Japanese war was a victory for China, the national security problem had not been solved at all. The most important aspect of the Korean War, however, was that China completely shook off the invading threat that had lasted since the 19th Century.

From a long-term point of view, the key of a nation's revival in history is to build up confidence, which is often established in one or two decisive battles. Therefore, all the rapidly thrived nations have undergone the tests of a few tough battles. The fact that China dared to fight against the most powerful country in the world in the Korean War, driving the US-headed UN Armies from Yalu River to the 38th parallel showed the forceful tendency of a rising nation. If it is said that the victory of the anti-Japanese War made us get rid of the fear of subjugation, then, the significance of the Korean war is that China not only rebuilt national dignity and won international respect, but also had completely recovered the long-lost national confidence since the Opium War.

History will tell that the victory in resisting US aggression and aiding Korea made the Chinese nation regain its confidence and provide an important psychological support for the revival of a great nation. In this sense, the war against US aggression and to aid Korea could well match the Battle of Salamis and the Battle of Leuthen: it was a war that determined the future destiny of China.

Any event may have both positive and negative effects. The Korean War too had its serious negative effects. A war against a foreign country requires that domestic manpower, materials and financial resources are centrally controlled and distributed, which leads to the centralization of power and planned economy. While planned economy is better suitable for a temporary state of war, it is unfavorable to long-term development. Participation in the Korean War was the logical continuation of the diplomatic policy of leaning to one side.

Although some like General Zhang Zhizhong hoped the new China would assume a neutral position in the world with the Soviet Union and the US as the two opposing powers in order to reap the spoils, it seems doubtful that this theoretically perfect policy could be put into practice. In terms of the quantity, scale and speed of foreign economic aid, could China have done better had it adopted a neutral policy?

Considering the degree of ideological confrontation in the world and the attitude of the United States toward the Chinese communist government, even if there had been no Korean War, the new China would not have got more economic and military aid from the United States and the other Western countries than from the Soviet Union, if the Chinese communist government had taken Taiwan and accomplished reunification, and explicitly declared a neutral policy. This emerges clearly by looking at the scale of aid of the anti-Soviet Yugoslavia from the West. Therefore, it was advisable to lean on the Soviet Union and enter the Korean War as the bargaining chip of economic assistance.

Nevertheless, siding with the USSR cut off the possibility of any developments in another direction. The hostile relationship between the Chinese communist government and the US become irredeemable, and transformed a potential enemy into an actual enemy. This kind of enmity might not be insoluble. Had it not been for the Korean War, surely the United States would not have interfered with the Taiwan affair had the Chinese communist government liberated Taiwan by force. If the whole country had been reunified and China had observed neutrality in diplomacy, the United States would have inevitably been aware that to maintain friendly relations with China would have been more favorable than pushing China into the Soviet bloc. And even if the Soviet Union had been unhappy with China or regarded Chinese leaders as ungrateful, it could have done nothing but maintain friendly relations, for it would have also thought that this would be more favorable than pushing China into the Western camp.

Thus China had two alternative choices in diplomacy: one was neutrality and it would have profited from both sides. In a state of mutual suspicion the Soviet Union and the United States would have hesitatingly tried to rope China in with some favors. But the total of favors from both sides would have not been much - no more than by leaning to one side. This policy would have reaped less benefit in the short term, but there would be some long-term benefit. If a war had broken out between the Soviet Union and the United States without the involvement of China, China would have benefited much by making political deals with both sides. Had the United States not developed itself while other powers were fighting against each other? This would be a heaven-sent chance.

The lesson from history is that, when the big powers are involved in wars, we should try to seize the most favorable diplomatic position - neutrality. The other alternative was to lean to one side in exchange for large amounts of economic aid, which had considerable short-term benefits, but more long-term troubles. For example, China would be under the control and coercion of the aid-giving nation, and suffer greater losses should it fall out with its donors. According to the conflict theory rule, "the closer the relations, the more easily clashes break out, and the fiercer and irreconcilable the clashes are". In fact, because of the past conflict, even later when Sino-US relations started and China became closer to the United States, the latter did not take its hands off Taiwan.

The biggest loss for China in the Korean War was on the issue of Taiwan. Due to the interference of the United States, the administration of the Nationalist Party survived in Taiwan. The new administration on the mainland was under threat if the hostile force was not eliminated. Any new administration always places the issue of survival first, construction second. In the history of China, when a dynasty was completely over, all the remainders of the old administration became the constructive resources of the new administration. Those who had been attached to the old administration lost their hope in the restoration of the old order, began to work wholeheartedly for the new administration, and the new administration was lenient enough to employ the useful talents of the old administration without hesitation.

Thanks to the National Party in Taiwan, there were forces waiting to restore the old order, and inevitably, the new administration would be suspicious of those from the old administration. The Marxist idea of class struggle was rampant, which in turn also enhanced the original internal contradictions in society. Especially the backbone group of modern construction - the intelligentsia - belonged to the group of Taiwan. In the meanwhile also the new administration, which stressed the class struggle theory and ideological contradiction, considered them as affiliated to the enemy, and thus those of this stratum were incapable of playing their role. Objectively the issue of Taiwan impeded the modernization of the mainland, and became one of the main factors that greatly postponed the beginning of a revival of the Chinese nation.

History and the development of the Taiwan issue will reveal the scope of the negative effect of the Korean War. If reunification is achieved peacefully, it might be said that the largest residual of the Korean War will have been removed. If Taiwan declared independence, the mainland would try to conquer the island by force and the United States would interfere. Then war would break out between China and the US, China would be defeated and would have to sue for peace, Taiwan would become independent, Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia would follow suit. China would be embroiled in incessant internal disorder, and we might say, in retrospect, that if things came to this, the earlier participation in the Korean War would have been a disastrous choice. The present decision-makers have to take this into account when deliberating over Taiwan.

The Worldwide Significance of the Korean War

Besides the evaluation of national interests, the Korean War also carries a worldwide meaning. In the history of war, historians call the decisive wars those that exert far-reaching influence. On waving goodbye to the 20th Century, we suddenly found that the 1950 Korean War had to be ranked as one of the most important and decisive wars in the century.

Firstly, an internal national conflict was quickly replaced by the ideological conflict between communism and capitalism. One side represented the social system and the belief of the capitalism; the other represented the system and belief of the socialism. Although mixed with traditional factors of national interest, the war was one of the most ideological in the 20th Century, and in history, only the Crusades are similar. Secondly, since the United States dropped two atomic bombs on Japan, human beings entered an epoch-making time of nuclear weapons and the world was full of terror and suspicion. People frequently wondered what later wars would be like or whether conventional wars were possible any more.

Being the first conventional war in the epoch of nuclear weapons, the Korean War set up a classic model for the limitations of conventional wars and solving conflicts under the threat of nuclear weapons. This classic model of a limited war is also epoch-making in war history. Thirdly, China's act to resist US aggression and aid Korea represented a great encouragement for the struggles against imperialism and colonialism in Asia and Africa. It made the United States the head of the "imperialist camp", while the old empires - Britain and France - were downgraded in World War II. The setback of the United States in the Korean Peninsula no doubt stimulated the oppressed nations to fight for freedom.

For the United States, the No 1 big power at that time, it was the first heavy blow to its confidence since the establishment of the country. Mark Wayne Clark, the commander-in-chief of the United Nations Forces, said, "I am the first general who signed on the truce agreement without victory in American history," which best illustrated the setback of American confidence.

Fourthly, the Korean War also rearranged the military strategic pattern of the whole world. The United States had to redeploy part of its forces in the East, and thus, got stuck in a quandary that the two ends of Western Europe and Asia could not be covered at the same time, which eased the pressure of the Soviet Union-headed socialist camp in Europe. Later, this camp gradually gained the upper hand and the Nato group had to take a defensive position.

General Omar Bradley, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, and general Guderian, the famous father of tanks, both agreed that the United States was in the wrong war at the wrong time and the wrong place with the wrong enemy. Therefore, another important meaning of the Korean War was that it broke the mythology of US invincibility. In history the only war that could match the Korean War was the Battle of Lepanto in 1517, in which the allied fleet of Venice and Spain defeated Osman's Turk fleet for the first time. This made the Europeans, who had long been terrorized, realize that the strong Turkish empire was not invincible. The Korean war made the whole world, including America, realize that the United States was not invincible.

Conclusion

On the issue of who won and who lost in the Korean War, there have been many different views abroad and at home. In meeting American military experts in the past few years, I have found that their opinions greatly differed, and at least one of them thought that they had not lost. The main reasons for the difference, I think, are that, at the early and late stages of the war, the strategic goals of both sides had been greatly adjusted. The main standard in judging victory or defeat in a war is to see which side attained or came close to its own strategic goals. Because of the great variations in strategic goals of both sides, differences have arisen in assessing victory and defeat. For China, I think, it failed to achieve the goal of driving the UN forces into the sea after the victory of the third campaign. But this strategic goal was not the most important, though it was a pity that it was not achieved.

China achieved its most important goal: to eliminate the foreign forces at its border and the threat to its national security. The United States, on its part, checked China's attempt to drive them to the sea, but the American attempt to reunify the Korean peninsula and to slaughter Chinese troops like lambs with its superior weapons failed. On balance, I think that in the Korean War the United States achieved no more than a draw, which was clear enough to be a failure; and China, as one of the weak countries, achieved a draw in a war with a strong power, which could be said to be a victory.

Half a century has elapsed since the Korean War. All things have two sides, the Korean War too. The point is to make advisable choices after an in-depth evaluation of the present and its far-reaching advantages and disadvantages. Although some side effects are still haunting us, this does not mean that the choice at that time was illogical, for no one could evaluate the situation and make a choice in isolation from the context.

In recent years, some have expressed reservations on the wisdom of entering the Korean War. In my opinion, human ability to predict is limited, and it is unfair for today's observer to expect from earlier decision-makers to take incalculable elements into consideration, such as the Sino-Soviet confrontation.

If the Taiwan issue will be solved to the satisfaction of all, the most significant aspect of the Korean War might be neglected. Many people just saw the rapid deterioration of Sino-American relations as its direct outcome, but failed to see that the war also underlay the possible normalization of relations between China and the United States.

According to certain theories on social conflict, besides the negative aspect of destruction, violent clashes have a positive and constructive aspect. They promote the knowledge and understanding between the opposing sides, and serve to adjust the position of the two sides. Thus, clashes are often the indispensable link on the road to the elimination of divergence and the establishment of good relations. For example, during the Vietnam War, direct clashes were avoided between China and the United States. There is a saying in Chinese: Friends are often made after a fight. In this sense, one of the far-reaching influences of the Korean War is that it indirectly played an irreplaceable role in the establishment of good relations between China and the United States.Ê

(Translated by Yao Ximing)

((c) Heartland. This version has been edited by Asia Times Online.)

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