Pakistan’s Geopolitical Dilema China Or US: Viewpoint From Pakistan – Analysis Written by: Eurasia Review

By Khan A. Sufyan

The dynamic nature of geo-political environment is transitioning from American efforts to retain its uni-polarity to a stage where the emerging competitors and challengers are moving to a position of asserting their influence. This is likely to result in geo-economic, geo-political and geo-strategic changes, realignments and re-assertions, in certain regions which are likely to play important, if not pivotal roles in the future. These are high-stake political games which may well result in either prolonging geo-political status-quo or the commencement of changes towards a multi-polar balance of power.

To maintain the geo-political status-quo, major US concerns are likely to remain focused on Asia. These include an emerging China, sustaining support for a countervailing India, a resurgent Russia and a concerned Muslim world attempting to redefine its place in the world polity. While US led efforts aimed at containment of Russia are stabilizing almost along the original Russian borders in Europe, endeavours to curtail her expansion towards the south and limit Russian and Chinese influence in Eurasian hinterland are underway.

Pakistan

In February 2002, Colin Powell told the House International Relations Committee that, “America will have a continuing interest and presence in Central Asia of a kind that we could not have dreamed of before.” Chairman of NATO Military Committee while on a recent visit to Australia stated that, securing the safety of Washington and Brussels requires the expansion of a US dominated military alliance into “the Euro-Asian and Asian-Pacific regions.” Major US and NATO presence in Afghanistan and their efforts to enhance military presence in various Central Asian countries under the garb of providing support for Afghan war are clear indications in this direction.

In the post 9/11 environment Asia therefore became the test-bed of American attempts to assert and realign the politico-economic order to maintain her full-spectrum domination and deny or delay the emergence and assurgence of competing powers. US invasion of Iraq was essentially a venture to sustain these objectives and not against terrorism which had roots in Afghanistan. It was thought that the US adventure in Iraq would achieve its objectives soon and would allow shifting the focus to stabilize Afghanistan for a protracted US presence because of geo-political compulsions. While the US was busy in Iraq, they co-opted Indian support to replace Pakistan as a stabilizing influence in Afghanistan, mainly due to Pak-US trust deficit. This also provided Americans an opportunity to project Indian influence in Central Asia to dilute the existing Russian and increasing Chinese support base.

Having failed in her earlier attempts to coerce Pakistan through application of direct strategy, India readily took this opportunity to pay back Pakistan for its alleged interference in Indian Occupied Kashmir and ventured in to a strategic encirclement of Pakistan. Under a calibrated strategy, US also supported India by attempting to persuade Pakistan to allow passageway for sustaining the Indian influence in Afghanistan and beyond. While addressing a press conference in January this year in Islamabad, Hillary Clinton openly supported this venture to the discomfiture of her hosts. However, Pakistan did not acquiesce and avoided a self-inflicted strategic encirclement.

Moreover, in order to dilute and contain resurgent Taliban, US contrived with Indian and Afghan support to shift the terrorist center of gravity to Pakistani territory resulting in manifold increase in drone attacks in Pak regions bordering Afghanistan. However, the US desire to confine this war to Af-pak region was short-lived. Soon the Taliban outside of so-called Af-pak region re-emerged stronger, warranting a US surge followed by a crisis of command and strategy.

Also, the Americans soon realized Indian inability to replace Pakistan’s strategic influence in its backyard. This also solidified the fact that the geo-politically influenced strategic pivot provided by Pakistan could not and would not be replaced by India, no matter how powerful India may be. Pakistan had withstood the challenge, no matter how weak it had been or would be. Achievement of US geo-political and geo-strategic goals therefore would become extremely difficult without co-opting Pakistan. This fact can not be overstated by citing a statement of Senator McCain (courtesy wikileaks), who while talking to David Cameron in a 2008 meeting said that, “if they (Pakistan) don’t cooperate and help us, I don’t know what we are going to do.”

Many believe that India is a regional power, yet they fail to realize the fact that its regional prowess can only be exercised against nations as small and vulnerable as Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Bangladesh. It has not been able to convincingly project its power potential against present day Pakistan and China and it is unlikely to happen in the future as well. US Embassy, New Delhi (courtesy wikileaks) corroborates this fact indicating that, with present Indian military capabilities, Cold Start doctrine would encounter mixed results.

US, France, UK, China and Russia etc can project their power potential because either they do not have a powerful regional threat to counter or they have enough capability to deter a regional threat and also project their capability to take care of extra-regional threats.

India cannot laterally expand its influence beyond its western borders due the existence of geo-political impediments in addition to the geographical restrictions placed by the presence of Pakistan. Expansion of its influence towards the east is impeded due to the large geographical lay of China. Myanmar can provide India with limited ability to expand towards South East Asia. She attempted to undertake such a venture but due to its internal upheaval in adjoining areas failed to take timely advantage. Chinese influence in Myanmar has in the meantime increased manifold which may limit future Indian endeavours. Therefore the only direction it may be able to expand its influence is towards the vast expanse of sea in the south.

As per the perceived US game-plan for India, garnering of a seaward influence is likely to be supported by the US and West. This fact is corroborated by increased number of Indian naval exercises with navies of US and other western nations in recent years. The plan seeks India to act as a countervailing force against China, as a milkman to sustain US economy while competing with Chinese economic progress and to stabilize regional disputes with limited force projection capability.

India may become a strong economic power and be able to generate fair bit of economic influence in all those countries which are its trading partners and may also be able to exercise fair bit of negativity against Pakistan and China in this domain. However, it’s overall power projection and generation of influence in the key regions would still remain limited unless it drastically improves relations with both Pakistan and China. It also highlights the importance of strategic nature of Pak-China relationship.
US follows a two pronged strategy against China, what some analysts term as “Contaigement” (Containment and Engagement). China counters this through application of a multi-faceted direct and indirect strategy. The engagement aspect does not irk both US and China to the extent of it being positive. Some of the major facets employed by China to counter the containment are; enhancement of politico-economic and military cooperation in key world regions, development of its military capability and seeking multiple trade corridors. Pakistan can offer major cooperation in many of these facets and thus emerges as a crucial player in facilitating for China a safe alternative outlet in to the global strategic zones.

China developed eastern Chinese region as a deliberate and well thought out policy. Now that this region has been well on its way to becoming a developed reality, western Chinese region bordering Pakistan is also being developed. The population of western China is close to 300 million people. The closest trade access to the sea for this large set of entrepreneurs is through Pakistan’s Karachi and Gwadar ports linked via Karakoram highway.

Pakistan’s sympathetic leanings towards China is one of the major causes of present trust-deficit between US and Pakistan, since the US in its endeavours to contain China is also eyeing Pakistan’s southern sea ports to acquire its own strategic corridor with links to Central Asian resources and to safeguard its interests. If this assumption is correct then it is quite likely that the US will continue to act as Pakistan’s neighbour for quite some time through its presence in Afghanistan and other regional countries and its projected withdrawal from Afghanistan is likely to remain restricted to end of combat operations.

In the 1960s, US attempted to follow the strategy of Pivotal Statecraft with regard to India and Pakistan. The strategy entailed that as US had influence and leverages in both India and Pakistan, it could manipulate or coerce both countries to find solutions to bilateral problems, under US auspices. However, the attempt failed as India had an alternative in the form of Russia and Pakistan looked for Chinese support. Apparently, US is attempting to follow a similar strategic posture again. Interestingly, in the ensuing geo-political environment India has no other entity to align with except the USA, whereas Pakistan can still lean towards China and frustrate US desires.

Pakistan therefore sits at the cross-roads of strategic interests of major world powers – an unenviable predicament or an enviable opportunity! Pakistan’s security and prosperity in the future therefore depends in a large way on how it exploits this geo-political tangle vis-à-vis these major contenders. It is here that Pakistan’s ability to generate a cooperative response from the great powers would be tested. Pakistan may not and should not become a party to any of the big powers and use its influence to generate a cooperative and all-supportive environment for future stability of the region. Pakistan’s decision makers must appreciate the strength Pakistan has placed itself in, despite the impediments and must not loose this strategic advantage. The success of Pakistani grand strategy depends upon its ability to manipulate co-relation of contending powers to its own advantage.

Khan A. Sufyan is a security analyst on South Asia, and has advised government, semi-government and private organizations and institutions on national and international security issues, as well as participating in a number of national and international seminars and presented papers on various regional and global security issues.
Recent Publicatio

Border City between China and North Korea

Viewpoint Asia: North Korea Chinese Film

AChinese viewpoint
By Ni Lexiong

Fifty years have elapsed since the Korean War, which broke out in 1950. Nonetheless, it is still very difficult to uncover all the truths, realize its significance and learn its lessons; rather, it is simply impossible. The political geography in Northeast Asia and part of the present world situation are the outcome of the Korean War. The significance and impact of the war are still unfolding.

The findings in any ongoing research are only but a small part of the total significance of the Korean War. In view of this, it is relatively easy to unearth some truths, while the discussion of the significance of the experiences and its lessons are very difficult to deal with.

On the justice of the Korean War

In researching the Korean War, Chinese scholars have been very often entangled in the trammels of ethics, and to make an ethical evaluation of wars has been the tradition of the Chinese nation. This has become the cultural subconscious of Chinese scholars, which often leads researchers to a narrow "right and wrong" terrain, from which they find no way out. Inevitably, they would attempt to find out "who fired the first shot", "who launched the attack first", and "who was the invader"? The research has unconsciously become a purely ethical evaluation, and much more important aspects have been totally ignored.

When the pursuit of interests does not contradict, but rather conforms to the principle of morality and justice, the fuse of wars is most easily ignited. In a civilized society in particular, it has become a necessity for every group to find some excuses for the war they plunge into. Even so, morality and justice are nothing but the "back-drop" for wars, rather than the goal.

Kim Il-sung and Syngman Rhee, then president of South Korea, had both been obsessed with the idea of dealing with the issue of unification by means of war. Yet, if national unification was the just claim of the Korean nation, then Kim and Rhee were the incarnation of this just claim. We cannot say that unification as seen from one side is just and from the other is unjust. If we go a little further to specify the standard of justice and say that it is just to carry out unification through peaceful means and unjust through violent means, viewed from their motivations, the two parties were ready to resort to force from the very beginning.

In terms of the origins and characteristics of the political groups represented by Kim and Rhee, both associated anti-Japanese conquest with violence, from which their personal and group experiences convinced them that violence was the only solution to the problem, a conviction that went well with the logic of both parties.

The difference was that the Soviet Union provided Kim Il-sung with offensive weapons, ie 150 T-34 tanks, the most advanced tanks at that time, that helped the Soviet Union to achieve its victory in the war against Germany. Later these tanks were used by the North Korean troops as vanguard and swept away all obstacles on their path. The United States, considering that the trouble on the Korean peninsula might detract its energies in Europe, refused to provide South Korea with offensive weapons, which included tanks, on the pretext that the terrain on the Korean Peninsula was unfavorable for mechanical military operations.

Suppose that weapon provisions had been reversed on the two sides, it might have been South Korea invading North Korea first. So it is meaningless to investigate who first started the war. Here we discovered that the "right or wrong" judgments in morality and justice could not be made without putting the facts in context. As far as Kim Il-sung was concerned, his actions conformed to his motivations, while due to the limitation of the objective conditions, Syngman Rhee had the motivation but found no means to put it into practice.

The difference between the two was no more than this. Later, when the South Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel, the only difference disappeared with it. Thus it can be seen that neither were willing to move behind the 38th parallel. At that time, however, when people made the judgment of right and wrong on the Korean conflict, the specific yardsticks of justice were the clauses in the Yalta Agreement and Potsdam Treaty.

If the unification of the Korean nation underlay the justice and legality of the war for both North and South Korea, where did the justice and legality of the involvement of China, the United States and Soviet Union lie? Although every belligerent was turning over their own interests in their minds, war would have been out of the question had it not been disguised with justice in a civilized society. Consequently it was compulsory to look for proof of the justice of the war; in fact, acknowledged principles of justice could always be found to suit their purposes, directly or indirectly. The US took as the principle of justice to maintain the Yalta peace system after World War II. The Soviet Union took the communist ideal that sought liberation for all human beings; and besides the communist ideal, China laid much stress on the principle of justice for maintaining state security.

Thus it can be seen that in different states and nations justice had different contents and the specific principles of justice often conflicted with each other. Kim Il-sung's principle of justice to achieve national unification conflicted with the principle of justice of Yalta. Stalin's communist principle to achieve the glorious ideal of human beings too conflicted with the principle of justice of Yalta. While the actions of the United States were complicated - South of the 38th parallel, it represented the principle of justice of Yalta, while crossing the 38th parallel represented the conflict between the principle of justice of the free world, of Yalta and of communism.

Not crossing the 38th for China represented the principles of justice, maintaining state safety, and loyalty to friends, communism and Yalta all rolled into one; and by crossing the 38th parallel, conflict with the Yalta principle of justice would arise. Therefore, in terms of ethics, the Korean war was a conflict between various principles of justice, and the principles of justice of each party presupposed the negation of the opposite party. Thus the Korean war was a tragedy in seeking principles of justice as well as seeking national interests.

The evaluation of interests of the Korean War

There have been several defects in past Chinese research on the Korean war. Ethical judgment was frequently, yet unconsciously, mixed with the evaluation of interests in the discussion. Only the positive effects of various kinds of actions were discussed, while the negative effects were not discussed or not allowed to be discussed; and too much attention had been put on morality and justice, while the systematic investigation into the losses and gains of the belligerent parties were neglected.

In analyzing the Korean war, the evaluation of interests is far more important than morality and justice. The latter cannot substitute the former, while the former should avoid the interference of the latter as much as possible.

For South as well as North Korea, since both resumed the original place at the 38th parallel, the two parties gained nothing but a loss of people and financial resources, the aggravation of hatred and the postponement of the national unification. In the camps they were in, the two parties of South and North were only bargaining chips in the diplomatic game played by the great powers. Therefore, the risks and responsibilities were their own, while the potential benefits were just proportionate to their role in the larger scheme.

In the end, the national disruption suffered by both parties was too heavy a price. The United States gained the following benefits: in terms of global strategic disposition, it stationed troops in South Korea again and advanced its strategic front to the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Strait. In terms of ideological antagonism, the United States stopped communism, seen as a fierce flood and a savage beast, far from its own gate. Its participation in the war was also a strong psychological support to those capitalist countries in Southeast Asia, which fell back on the United States, by means of which the United States expanded its influence in the region.

Viewed from the perspective of the communist cause, it was a failure for the Soviet Union, for it viewed the setbacks of other socialist countries as its own. In terms of the national interests from a narrow sense, however, the Soviet Union got the lion's share, with a depleted American force and the easing of pressure in Europe. What is more, the modern weapons used to equip 60 divisions and planes were well paid by China.

From the start of the Korean War, the US 7th Fleet sailed to the Taiwan Strait, a direct confrontation with China, which resulted in irredeemable damage to the Sino-American relation.

The division of China was objectively advantageous to the national security of the Soviet Union. In fact, China and North Korea became the cat's paws, maintaining the national interests of the Soviet Union without an iota of remuneration. The Soviet Union made big profits without making any investment.

It is very difficult to make an accurate analysis of Chinese losses and gains in the Korean War. The war had both elements of the communist campaign and of national interests, and the evaluation standards of the two were totally different, sometimes even opposite. Good to the former might not be good, sometimes even harmful, to the latter, and vice versa. By adopting the perspective of the global interests of the socialist family, China was so loyal to its friend in need to risk its own integrity by rushing to defend the Korean allies even when in disruption, suffering from the scars for 20-odd years of war with a poorly equipped army.

China was like a badly wounded soldier who rushed to fight again to save his companions when he should have retreated. Following the logic of socialist internationalism to the extreme, a war fiasco for a socialist country was worth it for the sake of the great communist cause.

But later it was discovered that the ideals of some countries were not so noble. They even made use of the name of socialism to serve their own country's interests, which resulted in the final disintegration of the European socialist camp, and once again, the traditional evaluation standard of national interests was resumed.

In this case, just as in life, those who are too loyal to their buddies suffer the heaviest losses. To risk one's life and fend off the sword thrust against a friend, one gets stabbed by the sword of both the enemy and the friend. Thus, today when we evaluate the diplomatic experiences and lessons from the point of view of national interests, we have to consider the advantages and disadvantages, gains and losses of our country in the war.

Considering national interests, the objective situation and the judgment of the decision-makers, it was advisable to resist the US aggression and help Korea. In crisis, when decision-makers come to a decision, they tend to consider dealing with the worst case scenario: it was better to stop the threat from Korea at the 38th parallel, which suppressed the desire of an invasion in the direction of Taiwan. Had the choice been different, foreign invading forces would have conquered the whole Korean peninsula and then invaded mainland China. Viewed purely from the perspective of national security, this strategic consideration was no doubt advisable, as then proven by facts.

In the Korean War, the former Soviet Union equipped 60 (some say 100) Chinese divisions, helped our country to rapidly establish an air force with a quite strong fighting capacity, which improved the combat effectiveness of our army.

Considering long-term national interests, participation in the Korean War eased the pressure of the Soviet bloc in Europe and enhanced trust between China and the USSR. As a reward, the Soviet Union provided our country with a large amount of aid, which exerted inestimable influence on the recovery of our country's economy and its future development. Although the relationship between China and the Soviet Union worsened later and we tried our best to diminish the significance of assistance from the Soviet Union, the objective influence of aid were an indelible truth. Now some thought that we suffered too much, having been the cannon fodder for the Soviet Union - a side effect of underestimating USSR aid. In fact, Soviet aid had no historical comparison and was more copious than US aid during the anti-Japanese war. Comparing the political deals between countries, Mao Zedong gained much more in the deal with the Soviet Union than Chiang Kai-shek from the deal with the US.

Another great consequence of the Korean war was that China completely removed the threat of foreign invasion that had lasted for over 100 years. Since the Opium War, China was defeated time and again in wars with Western powers, which caused the permeation of the dread of being subjugated. The crisis of national security reached its apex in the 1930s with the invasion of Japanese capitalists. If the war had not developed to the scale of a worldwide anti-fascist war with China, America, Britain and the Soviet Union allied to fight against Japan, but only a war between China and Japan, the result would not have been optimistic at all.

At least, it was impossible to make Japan accept unconditional surrender relying solely on China's force. The victory in the anti-Japanese war eased the countrymen's dread of being subjugated, and China ranked as one of the four big powers in the world. The status of China as one of the four big powers had not been very convincing, however. The Yalta Conference, at which the postwar interests were divided, was held without China. The Soviet Union demanded forcibly the independence of outer Mongolia so that a buffer belt was established between China and the Soviet Union, which explained all. This was the same as when World War I was over, the Versailles Treaty ruled that the leased territory of Germany in Shandong province was passed over to Japan. It was rare in world history that the victorious nation gained less but lost more land (though Taiwan was recovered). It can be seen from this how weak China was - even if one of the four big powers! Although the anti-Japanese war was a victory for China, the national security problem had not been solved at all. The most important aspect of the Korean War, however, was that China completely shook off the invading threat that had lasted since the 19th Century.

From a long-term point of view, the key of a nation's revival in history is to build up confidence, which is often established in one or two decisive battles. Therefore, all the rapidly thrived nations have undergone the tests of a few tough battles. The fact that China dared to fight against the most powerful country in the world in the Korean War, driving the US-headed UN Armies from Yalu River to the 38th parallel showed the forceful tendency of a rising nation. If it is said that the victory of the anti-Japanese War made us get rid of the fear of subjugation, then, the significance of the Korean war is that China not only rebuilt national dignity and won international respect, but also had completely recovered the long-lost national confidence since the Opium War.

History will tell that the victory in resisting US aggression and aiding Korea made the Chinese nation regain its confidence and provide an important psychological support for the revival of a great nation. In this sense, the war against US aggression and to aid Korea could well match the Battle of Salamis and the Battle of Leuthen: it was a war that determined the future destiny of China.

Any event may have both positive and negative effects. The Korean War too had its serious negative effects. A war against a foreign country requires that domestic manpower, materials and financial resources are centrally controlled and distributed, which leads to the centralization of power and planned economy. While planned economy is better suitable for a temporary state of war, it is unfavorable to long-term development. Participation in the Korean War was the logical continuation of the diplomatic policy of leaning to one side.

Although some like General Zhang Zhizhong hoped the new China would assume a neutral position in the world with the Soviet Union and the US as the two opposing powers in order to reap the spoils, it seems doubtful that this theoretically perfect policy could be put into practice. In terms of the quantity, scale and speed of foreign economic aid, could China have done better had it adopted a neutral policy?

Considering the degree of ideological confrontation in the world and the attitude of the United States toward the Chinese communist government, even if there had been no Korean War, the new China would not have got more economic and military aid from the United States and the other Western countries than from the Soviet Union, if the Chinese communist government had taken Taiwan and accomplished reunification, and explicitly declared a neutral policy. This emerges clearly by looking at the scale of aid of the anti-Soviet Yugoslavia from the West. Therefore, it was advisable to lean on the Soviet Union and enter the Korean War as the bargaining chip of economic assistance.

Nevertheless, siding with the USSR cut off the possibility of any developments in another direction. The hostile relationship between the Chinese communist government and the US become irredeemable, and transformed a potential enemy into an actual enemy. This kind of enmity might not be insoluble. Had it not been for the Korean War, surely the United States would not have interfered with the Taiwan affair had the Chinese communist government liberated Taiwan by force. If the whole country had been reunified and China had observed neutrality in diplomacy, the United States would have inevitably been aware that to maintain friendly relations with China would have been more favorable than pushing China into the Soviet bloc. And even if the Soviet Union had been unhappy with China or regarded Chinese leaders as ungrateful, it could have done nothing but maintain friendly relations, for it would have also thought that this would be more favorable than pushing China into the Western camp.

Thus China had two alternative choices in diplomacy: one was neutrality and it would have profited from both sides. In a state of mutual suspicion the Soviet Union and the United States would have hesitatingly tried to rope China in with some favors. But the total of favors from both sides would have not been much - no more than by leaning to one side. This policy would have reaped less benefit in the short term, but there would be some long-term benefit. If a war had broken out between the Soviet Union and the United States without the involvement of China, China would have benefited much by making political deals with both sides. Had the United States not developed itself while other powers were fighting against each other? This would be a heaven-sent chance.

The lesson from history is that, when the big powers are involved in wars, we should try to seize the most favorable diplomatic position - neutrality. The other alternative was to lean to one side in exchange for large amounts of economic aid, which had considerable short-term benefits, but more long-term troubles. For example, China would be under the control and coercion of the aid-giving nation, and suffer greater losses should it fall out with its donors. According to the conflict theory rule, "the closer the relations, the more easily clashes break out, and the fiercer and irreconcilable the clashes are". In fact, because of the past conflict, even later when Sino-US relations started and China became closer to the United States, the latter did not take its hands off Taiwan.

The biggest loss for China in the Korean War was on the issue of Taiwan. Due to the interference of the United States, the administration of the Nationalist Party survived in Taiwan. The new administration on the mainland was under threat if the hostile force was not eliminated. Any new administration always places the issue of survival first, construction second. In the history of China, when a dynasty was completely over, all the remainders of the old administration became the constructive resources of the new administration. Those who had been attached to the old administration lost their hope in the restoration of the old order, began to work wholeheartedly for the new administration, and the new administration was lenient enough to employ the useful talents of the old administration without hesitation.

Thanks to the National Party in Taiwan, there were forces waiting to restore the old order, and inevitably, the new administration would be suspicious of those from the old administration. The Marxist idea of class struggle was rampant, which in turn also enhanced the original internal contradictions in society. Especially the backbone group of modern construction - the intelligentsia - belonged to the group of Taiwan. In the meanwhile also the new administration, which stressed the class struggle theory and ideological contradiction, considered them as affiliated to the enemy, and thus those of this stratum were incapable of playing their role. Objectively the issue of Taiwan impeded the modernization of the mainland, and became one of the main factors that greatly postponed the beginning of a revival of the Chinese nation.

History and the development of the Taiwan issue will reveal the scope of the negative effect of the Korean War. If reunification is achieved peacefully, it might be said that the largest residual of the Korean War will have been removed. If Taiwan declared independence, the mainland would try to conquer the island by force and the United States would interfere. Then war would break out between China and the US, China would be defeated and would have to sue for peace, Taiwan would become independent, Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia would follow suit. China would be embroiled in incessant internal disorder, and we might say, in retrospect, that if things came to this, the earlier participation in the Korean War would have been a disastrous choice. The present decision-makers have to take this into account when deliberating over Taiwan.

The Worldwide Significance of the Korean War

Besides the evaluation of national interests, the Korean War also carries a worldwide meaning. In the history of war, historians call the decisive wars those that exert far-reaching influence. On waving goodbye to the 20th Century, we suddenly found that the 1950 Korean War had to be ranked as one of the most important and decisive wars in the century.

Firstly, an internal national conflict was quickly replaced by the ideological conflict between communism and capitalism. One side represented the social system and the belief of the capitalism; the other represented the system and belief of the socialism. Although mixed with traditional factors of national interest, the war was one of the most ideological in the 20th Century, and in history, only the Crusades are similar. Secondly, since the United States dropped two atomic bombs on Japan, human beings entered an epoch-making time of nuclear weapons and the world was full of terror and suspicion. People frequently wondered what later wars would be like or whether conventional wars were possible any more.

Being the first conventional war in the epoch of nuclear weapons, the Korean War set up a classic model for the limitations of conventional wars and solving conflicts under the threat of nuclear weapons. This classic model of a limited war is also epoch-making in war history. Thirdly, China's act to resist US aggression and aid Korea represented a great encouragement for the struggles against imperialism and colonialism in Asia and Africa. It made the United States the head of the "imperialist camp", while the old empires - Britain and France - were downgraded in World War II. The setback of the United States in the Korean Peninsula no doubt stimulated the oppressed nations to fight for freedom.

For the United States, the No 1 big power at that time, it was the first heavy blow to its confidence since the establishment of the country. Mark Wayne Clark, the commander-in-chief of the United Nations Forces, said, "I am the first general who signed on the truce agreement without victory in American history," which best illustrated the setback of American confidence.

Fourthly, the Korean War also rearranged the military strategic pattern of the whole world. The United States had to redeploy part of its forces in the East, and thus, got stuck in a quandary that the two ends of Western Europe and Asia could not be covered at the same time, which eased the pressure of the Soviet Union-headed socialist camp in Europe. Later, this camp gradually gained the upper hand and the Nato group had to take a defensive position.

General Omar Bradley, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, and general Guderian, the famous father of tanks, both agreed that the United States was in the wrong war at the wrong time and the wrong place with the wrong enemy. Therefore, another important meaning of the Korean War was that it broke the mythology of US invincibility. In history the only war that could match the Korean War was the Battle of Lepanto in 1517, in which the allied fleet of Venice and Spain defeated Osman's Turk fleet for the first time. This made the Europeans, who had long been terrorized, realize that the strong Turkish empire was not invincible. The Korean war made the whole world, including America, realize that the United States was not invincible.

Conclusion

On the issue of who won and who lost in the Korean War, there have been many different views abroad and at home. In meeting American military experts in the past few years, I have found that their opinions greatly differed, and at least one of them thought that they had not lost. The main reasons for the difference, I think, are that, at the early and late stages of the war, the strategic goals of both sides had been greatly adjusted. The main standard in judging victory or defeat in a war is to see which side attained or came close to its own strategic goals. Because of the great variations in strategic goals of both sides, differences have arisen in assessing victory and defeat. For China, I think, it failed to achieve the goal of driving the UN forces into the sea after the victory of the third campaign. But this strategic goal was not the most important, though it was a pity that it was not achieved.

China achieved its most important goal: to eliminate the foreign forces at its border and the threat to its national security. The United States, on its part, checked China's attempt to drive them to the sea, but the American attempt to reunify the Korean peninsula and to slaughter Chinese troops like lambs with its superior weapons failed. On balance, I think that in the Korean War the United States achieved no more than a draw, which was clear enough to be a failure; and China, as one of the weak countries, achieved a draw in a war with a strong power, which could be said to be a victory.

Half a century has elapsed since the Korean War. All things have two sides, the Korean War too. The point is to make advisable choices after an in-depth evaluation of the present and its far-reaching advantages and disadvantages. Although some side effects are still haunting us, this does not mean that the choice at that time was illogical, for no one could evaluate the situation and make a choice in isolation from the context.

In recent years, some have expressed reservations on the wisdom of entering the Korean War. In my opinion, human ability to predict is limited, and it is unfair for today's observer to expect from earlier decision-makers to take incalculable elements into consideration, such as the Sino-Soviet confrontation.

If the Taiwan issue will be solved to the satisfaction of all, the most significant aspect of the Korean War might be neglected. Many people just saw the rapid deterioration of Sino-American relations as its direct outcome, but failed to see that the war also underlay the possible normalization of relations between China and the United States.

According to certain theories on social conflict, besides the negative aspect of destruction, violent clashes have a positive and constructive aspect. They promote the knowledge and understanding between the opposing sides, and serve to adjust the position of the two sides. Thus, clashes are often the indispensable link on the road to the elimination of divergence and the establishment of good relations. For example, during the Vietnam War, direct clashes were avoided between China and the United States. There is a saying in Chinese: Friends are often made after a fight. In this sense, one of the far-reaching influences of the Korean War is that it indirectly played an irreplaceable role in the establishment of good relations between China and the United States.Ê

(Translated by Yao Ximing)

((c) Heartland. This version has been edited by Asia Times Online.)

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11. A Chinese Viewpoint - Importance of Six Party talks

Importance of Six-Party Talks

by Sun Ru

BEIJING, Nov. 5 (Xinhuanet) -- The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) released the results of its investigation into the sinking of Cheonan, a corvette of the Republic of Korea (ROK), on Tuesday, describing an earlier international inquiry report as the "most hideous conspiratorial farce in history".

Before the release of its investigation results, the DPRK said it was ready to return to the Six-Party Talks. Although the United States, the ROK and Japan have been urging the DPRK to do so, they now insist that the talks can only be resumed if the DPRK makes compromises such as holding a bilateral dialogue with the ROK, apologizing for the Cheonan incident and shutting down its nuclear facilities.

The US and the ROK have rejected China's three-step proposal for reopening the Six-Party Talks, too. China's proposal included bilateral talks between the US and the DPRK, a meeting of the heads of delegation of the six parties (Russia is the other party) followed by a comprehensive Six-Party Talks.

The US-ROK-Japan preconditions for resuming the talks have blocked the way back to the table. Their preconditions, especially linking Seoul-Pyongyang bilateral dialogue with the Six-Party talks, undermine the main objective of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

The Six-Party Talks, as history shows, have helped overcome a lot of differences among the countries. In the absence of significant progress on the denuclearization issue and the alleged abduction of Japanese nationals by the DPRK, Tokyo once refused to normalize relations with Pyongyang and offer it the promised energy aid. The deadlock was broken only through multinational negotiations.

Hence, the resumption of the Six-Party Talks calls for the joint efforts of all the six countries. If the DPRK is required to agree to dismantle its nuclear programs, the other parties are required to fulfill their part of the promise.

The US, the ROK and Japan have stuck to their stance apparently because of the Cheonan incident. Soon after the incident, the US and the ROK sounded reluctant to resume the multilateral talks, accused the DPRK of aggression, imposed a series of sanctions on it and launched a global anti-Pyongyang campaign.

The two countries even engaged in a series of joint military drills to threaten the DPRK.

The US and the ROK insist on a Seoul-Pyongyang dialogue instead of bilateral talks between Washington and Pyongyang, as proposed by China.

After Japan's former prime minister Yukio Hatoyama asked the US to shift its air base from Okinawa, Washington persuaded Seoul to exert pressure on Tokyo to change its stance. The Cheonan incident came as a diversion, which the US exploited not only to maintain its base in Okinawa, but also to fan passions against the DPRK. Unhappy with China's position in the Cheonan incident, the US and the ROK even tried to force it to support their "cause", failing which they rejected its proposal.

From what the US and the ROK have been saying since last year, it appears that they believe the DPRK will not abandon its nuclear program now and hence the Six-Party Talks are an effort in futility.

No wonder, they have been trying to destabilize the DPRK after the Cheonan incident to "denuclearize the Korean Peninsula once and for all". Perhaps that's the reason why the US and the ROK have been reluctant to return to the talks and why the DPRK's satellite launch and nuclear experiment have been less important for them than the handover of power in Pyongyang.

But no matter what the US, the ROK and Japan do, the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue cannot be resolved without the Six-Party Talks. To accelerate the process of denuclearization, all the six parties have to return to the table and the US, the ROK and Japan have to withdraw their preconditions. At best, the trio can insist on an inspection of the DPRK's nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency after the resumption of the talks.

The Barack Obama administration has appealed for global cooperation, claiming to have begun a new era of the US relationship with other countries. Addressing the Council on Foreign Relations, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said diplomacy was one of the two cornerstones of Washington's "global leadership".

Yet the US has failed to justify its so-called global leadership. It's time the US did something really constructive for peace and stability. It can start by creating the right conditions for holding the Six-Party Talks.

The ROK, on its part, should realize the connection between the Cheonan incident and the tension on the peninsula, take interest in maintaining peace in Northeast Asia and stop flexing its muscles.

The DPRK should give up its preconditions, too. It should not insist that the US should lift its sanctions and sign a peace treaty with it before it returns to the talks.

Different parties have different understandings of the peaceful mechanism. At times, they clash over issues like how to establish such a mechanism or how to hold talks, making it more difficult to reach an agreement. The futile talks among China, the DPRK, the US and the ROK over the past two years show that getting two parties to sign a peace treaty requires long-term efforts.

Lifting of sanctions, too, is not a short-term mission. The financial sanctions against the DPRK did not prevent the Statement of Principles from being issued on Sept 19, 2005. Likewise, the sanctions against the DPRK cannot stop it from making the most from denuclearization and relaxation of tensions on the peninsula.

Therefore, the DPRK should take concrete actions to reduce the anxiety of the US, the ROK and Japan and create conditions necessary for economic development and improvement of its people's livelihood.

There are many problems to be discussed. What are the major issues to be negotiated once the Six-Party Talks resume? How can the process of denuclearization be carried out without harming the DPRK's security? All these problems call for serious and thorough discussions. That's why the main task of the six countries now is to join hands to draw up a blueprint for the denuclearization of the peninsula.

The author is a research scholar in US studies at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations.

(Source: China Daily)

JAPAN'S VIEWPOINT

GENERAL OVERVIEW

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THE YASUKUNI SHRINE

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SHINTOISM IN JAPAN

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HISTORY OF CONFLICT

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CHINA'S VIEWPOINT

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JAPAN'S VIEWPOINT

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Sources

GOVERNMENT VISITS TO YASUKUNI-JINJA

In 1978, Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe Shintaro of the Fukuda Takeo Cabinet declared that a prime minister was free to visit shrines and temples as a private citizen. However, the Prime Minister was still allowed to use a government car in case of emergency and was allowed to have other government officials accompany him. Prime Ministers Ohira Masayoshi, Suzuki Zenko and Nakasone Yasuhiro all continued to visit Yasukuni-jinja using these guidelines after the revelation that 14 class A war criminals were enshrined there.

In 1980, Chief Cabinet Secretary Miyazawa Kiichi of the Suzuki Cabinet said the government could not dispel doubts about the possibility of violating the Constitution by official visits since the law does require a separation of church and state.

In 1985 Prime Minister Nakasone declared his visit to Yasukuni-jinja “official” and used public funds to donate to the shrine but did not perform the Shinto ceremony in which a person must purify himself by offering a sprig of the sacred sasaki tree, bow twice, clap hands twice and bow again.(18)

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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Since his first visit in August of 2001 the current Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro has visited Yasukuni-jinja on a yearly basis. However, on September 30th 2005 the Osaka High Court ruled that Koizumi’s visits were unconstitutional. Koizumi himself claims to have visited Yasukuni “as a private citizen, and as prime minister, but not in a public capacity." Politicians and experts say Mr. Koizumi goes mainly to prove his patriotic credentials to conservative members of his governing Liberal Democratic Party, unfortunately by leaving his visits vague by not declaring them unofficial or official the court claims that the visits “were a public act and therefore violated the Constitution's separation of religion and state.” (11)

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SUPPORT AND OPPOSITION

War veterans and right wing politicians support Koizumi’s visits to the shrine as being both respectful of those who sacrificed themselves for Japan and as a way of asserting to the rest of the world that Japan is an independent nation with a proud history.

In contrast, radical student groups and left wing politicians view Koizumi’s visits as a symbol of Japanese militarism and desire to create conflict amongst nations harmed by Japanese brutality such as China, the US and Korea.

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POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

There has been great discussion about how to handle the issue of Yasukuni-jinja and its place in Japanese society. There have been suggestions for moving the 14 Class-A war criminals out of the shrine to a secular memorial, however the Shinto priests claim this is not possible without violating Shinto doctrine.

The government would be in violation of Article 20 of the Constitution, which stipulates the separation of religion and state, if it forces Yasukuni Shrine as a religious corporation to enshrine the Class-A criminals separately. Proponents for separate enshrinement still exist within the ruling parties, claiming that such action could be taken once the plan has been discussed and approved by the shrine and relevant family members of those

Viewpoint: Japan plant - who is in charge?

By Yuki Tatsumi Stimson Center

As Japan works to recover from its greatest natural disaster in modern times, attention remains focused on the evolving situation at the crippled Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant.

Despite efforts by Tokyo Electric Power Company's (Tepco) engineers, the Self-Defence Forces, police and firemen, conditions there appear to have grown steadily worse.

On 1 April, Prime Minister Naoto Kan admitted that the plant had not yet been "sufficiently stabilised", acknowledging it would be a "long-term battle".

Since the beginning, one of the unanswered questions has been: "Who is in charge?"

A Japanese law laying out measures to be taken by the government in case of a nuclear energy disaster dictates that when a nuclear accident happens, an atomic power disaster response headquarters headed by the prime minister is to be established.

This ad hoc headquarters is expected to take charge of setting out the government's response and facilitating necessary inter-agency co-ordination within the government.

As the head of the disaster response headquarters, the prime minister has the authority to direct relevant government agencies as well as private companies that are involved in responding to the disaster.

He has two entities from which to draw expert opinions to assist him in decision-making: the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (Nisa, an agency within the Ministry of Economy, Industry and Trade (Meti)) and the Nuclear Safety Commission, an advisory panel made up of non-government experts.

So, legally speaking, the prime minister of Japan is in charge. Or he is supposed to be.

Advisers

So what of Mr Kan's leadership to date? On the one hand, it has been clear that he wants to appear in charge: he wanted to "speak directly to the Japanese people" in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake.

Mr Kan has made several addresses to the nation since the 11 March quake

He issued a press statement immediately after the disaster, and so far has made five televised addresses, most recently on 25 March. Four days after the quake, amid confusion over the situation at the plant, he was overheard by journalists asking Tepco executives: "What the hell is going on?"

Demonstrating his distrust in Tepco and Meti, he has appointed a number of non-government experts in addition to those who are already in advisory roles. As of 29 March, 5 out of 15 advisers were appointed specifically to advise on the situation at the plant.

Yet despite his efforts, as more time passes he appears less in charge. In terms of media questions, he has for the most part left the top government spokesman, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano, and Tepco executives in the hot seat.

Too many advisers around Mr Kan have created confusion in the communication process within government, making it harder, not easier, for him to make decisions.

Instead, we have witnessed finger-pointing, primarily at Tepco and also at Nisa. In fact, the idea of separating Nisa from Meti and making it an independent agency has already been floated as one of the lessons learned from the situation.

This is because the Kan government feels that Meti has been in too cosy a relationship with Tepco - to the extent that it has not exercised proper supervisory authority over the power giant and its response to the plant situation.

'Too big to fail'

Certainly, Tepco deserves the criticism that it has been receiving. For one thing, Tepco does not have a good record of managing nuclear accidents. Its responses to previous incidents have been severely criticised as "tardy" and "not forthcoming with timely information".

Plant operator Tepco has come in for criticism over its handling of the situation

In 2002 it was also revealed that Tepco had been forging safety inspection records of some of its nuclear power plants. This time, Tepco has been severely criticised as it may have underestimated the gravity of the situation in the first several days.

In addition, it has been castigated by the government for not only not being forthcoming with critical radiation information, but also providing incorrect radiation readings from the plant.

As a power company with a monopoly in providing electricity to Tokyo and eight prefectures in eastern Japan, no one can deny that Tepco has been plagued with a "We are too big to fail" mentality, making it less proactive about emergency planning.

The decades-long tradition of close co-operation between big businesses and the government agencies that have regulatory and supervisory authority over them has certainly contributed to lapses in oversight.

It also, in part, has made the government dependent on these businesses for technical expertise.

Shut out

That said, Mr Kan's performance in responding to the accident at the plant is also illustrative of the fundamental problem in the governance style of his Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ).

The DPJ-led government was elected in August 2009, ending more than five decades of almost unbroken rule by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).

Even before this crisis hit, the DPJ's insistence on "leadership by politicians" - compared to the consensus, bottom-up style adopted by the LDP - had created problems.

The DPJ's deep mistrust in the bureaucracy has driven them to go outside existing government frameworks to look for solutions rather than attempting to effectively utilise the bureaucracy.

By alienating the bureaucracy in the decision-making process, the relationship between DPJ political leaders and the bureaucrats has been greatly soured. Its approach also prevented the DPJ from learning how to maximise bureaucrats' policy and technical expertise.

Given that the magnitude of the disaster that Mr Kan and his government face is unprecedented, there is no guarantee that an LDP government would have been able to respond to the crisis any better.

Even so, Mr Kan's instinct to look outside the government for counsel without tapping into the knowledge of the bureaucracy has created a situation in which he has essentially excluded the bureaucrats as a source of information.

This is critically disadvantageous, as the prime minister's chosen advisers - despite being experts in their field - will not have the same level of on-the-ground information.

Without better utilising the expertise that already exists in the bureaucracy, we will continue to see Mr Kan and his government fall behind the curve in its response.

Yuki Tatsumi is senior associate of the East Asia Programme at the Stimson Center, a Washington DC-based think-tank.

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