Thursday, April 7, 2011

11. A Chinese Viewpoint - Importance of Six Party talks

Importance of Six-Party Talks

by Sun Ru

BEIJING, Nov. 5 (Xinhuanet) -- The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) released the results of its investigation into the sinking of Cheonan, a corvette of the Republic of Korea (ROK), on Tuesday, describing an earlier international inquiry report as the "most hideous conspiratorial farce in history".

Before the release of its investigation results, the DPRK said it was ready to return to the Six-Party Talks. Although the United States, the ROK and Japan have been urging the DPRK to do so, they now insist that the talks can only be resumed if the DPRK makes compromises such as holding a bilateral dialogue with the ROK, apologizing for the Cheonan incident and shutting down its nuclear facilities.

The US and the ROK have rejected China's three-step proposal for reopening the Six-Party Talks, too. China's proposal included bilateral talks between the US and the DPRK, a meeting of the heads of delegation of the six parties (Russia is the other party) followed by a comprehensive Six-Party Talks.

The US-ROK-Japan preconditions for resuming the talks have blocked the way back to the table. Their preconditions, especially linking Seoul-Pyongyang bilateral dialogue with the Six-Party talks, undermine the main objective of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

The Six-Party Talks, as history shows, have helped overcome a lot of differences among the countries. In the absence of significant progress on the denuclearization issue and the alleged abduction of Japanese nationals by the DPRK, Tokyo once refused to normalize relations with Pyongyang and offer it the promised energy aid. The deadlock was broken only through multinational negotiations.

Hence, the resumption of the Six-Party Talks calls for the joint efforts of all the six countries. If the DPRK is required to agree to dismantle its nuclear programs, the other parties are required to fulfill their part of the promise.

The US, the ROK and Japan have stuck to their stance apparently because of the Cheonan incident. Soon after the incident, the US and the ROK sounded reluctant to resume the multilateral talks, accused the DPRK of aggression, imposed a series of sanctions on it and launched a global anti-Pyongyang campaign.

The two countries even engaged in a series of joint military drills to threaten the DPRK.

The US and the ROK insist on a Seoul-Pyongyang dialogue instead of bilateral talks between Washington and Pyongyang, as proposed by China.

After Japan's former prime minister Yukio Hatoyama asked the US to shift its air base from Okinawa, Washington persuaded Seoul to exert pressure on Tokyo to change its stance. The Cheonan incident came as a diversion, which the US exploited not only to maintain its base in Okinawa, but also to fan passions against the DPRK. Unhappy with China's position in the Cheonan incident, the US and the ROK even tried to force it to support their "cause", failing which they rejected its proposal.

From what the US and the ROK have been saying since last year, it appears that they believe the DPRK will not abandon its nuclear program now and hence the Six-Party Talks are an effort in futility.

No wonder, they have been trying to destabilize the DPRK after the Cheonan incident to "denuclearize the Korean Peninsula once and for all". Perhaps that's the reason why the US and the ROK have been reluctant to return to the talks and why the DPRK's satellite launch and nuclear experiment have been less important for them than the handover of power in Pyongyang.

But no matter what the US, the ROK and Japan do, the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue cannot be resolved without the Six-Party Talks. To accelerate the process of denuclearization, all the six parties have to return to the table and the US, the ROK and Japan have to withdraw their preconditions. At best, the trio can insist on an inspection of the DPRK's nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency after the resumption of the talks.

The Barack Obama administration has appealed for global cooperation, claiming to have begun a new era of the US relationship with other countries. Addressing the Council on Foreign Relations, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said diplomacy was one of the two cornerstones of Washington's "global leadership".

Yet the US has failed to justify its so-called global leadership. It's time the US did something really constructive for peace and stability. It can start by creating the right conditions for holding the Six-Party Talks.

The ROK, on its part, should realize the connection between the Cheonan incident and the tension on the peninsula, take interest in maintaining peace in Northeast Asia and stop flexing its muscles.

The DPRK should give up its preconditions, too. It should not insist that the US should lift its sanctions and sign a peace treaty with it before it returns to the talks.

Different parties have different understandings of the peaceful mechanism. At times, they clash over issues like how to establish such a mechanism or how to hold talks, making it more difficult to reach an agreement. The futile talks among China, the DPRK, the US and the ROK over the past two years show that getting two parties to sign a peace treaty requires long-term efforts.

Lifting of sanctions, too, is not a short-term mission. The financial sanctions against the DPRK did not prevent the Statement of Principles from being issued on Sept 19, 2005. Likewise, the sanctions against the DPRK cannot stop it from making the most from denuclearization and relaxation of tensions on the peninsula.

Therefore, the DPRK should take concrete actions to reduce the anxiety of the US, the ROK and Japan and create conditions necessary for economic development and improvement of its people's livelihood.

There are many problems to be discussed. What are the major issues to be negotiated once the Six-Party Talks resume? How can the process of denuclearization be carried out without harming the DPRK's security? All these problems call for serious and thorough discussions. That's why the main task of the six countries now is to join hands to draw up a blueprint for the denuclearization of the peninsula.

The author is a research scholar in US studies at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations.

(Source: China Daily)

Wednesday, April 6, 2011

JAPAN'S VIEWPOINT

GENERAL OVERVIEW

GOVERNMENT VISITS TO YASUKUNI-JINJA

In 1978, Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe Shintaro of the Fukuda Takeo Cabinet declared that a prime minister was free to visit shrines and temples as a private citizen. However, the Prime Minister was still allowed to use a government car in case of emergency and was allowed to have other government officials accompany him. Prime Ministers Ohira Masayoshi, Suzuki Zenko and Nakasone Yasuhiro all continued to visit Yasukuni-jinja using these guidelines after the revelation that 14 class A war criminals were enshrined there.

In 1980, Chief Cabinet Secretary Miyazawa Kiichi of the Suzuki Cabinet said the government could not dispel doubts about the possibility of violating the Constitution by official visits since the law does require a separation of church and state.

In 1985 Prime Minister Nakasone declared his visit to Yasukuni-jinja “official” and used public funds to donate to the shrine but did not perform the Shinto ceremony in which a person must purify himself by offering a sprig of the sacred sasaki tree, bow twice, clap hands twice and bow again.(18)

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Since his first visit in August of 2001 the current Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro has visited Yasukuni-jinja on a yearly basis. However, on September 30th 2005 the Osaka High Court ruled that Koizumi’s visits were unconstitutional. Koizumi himself claims to have visited Yasukuni “as a private citizen, and as prime minister, but not in a public capacity." Politicians and experts say Mr. Koizumi goes mainly to prove his patriotic credentials to conservative members of his governing Liberal Democratic Party, unfortunately by leaving his visits vague by not declaring them unofficial or official the court claims that the visits “were a public act and therefore violated the Constitution's separation of religion and state.” (11)

SUPPORT AND OPPOSITION

War veterans and right wing politicians support Koizumi’s visits to the shrine as being both respectful of those who sacrificed themselves for Japan and as a way of asserting to the rest of the world that Japan is an independent nation with a proud history.

In contrast, radical student groups and left wing politicians view Koizumi’s visits as a symbol of Japanese militarism and desire to create conflict amongst nations harmed by Japanese brutality such as China, the US and Korea.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

There has been great discussion about how to handle the issue of Yasukuni-jinja and its place in Japanese society. There have been suggestions for moving the 14 Class-A war criminals out of the shrine to a secular memorial, however the Shinto priests claim this is not possible without violating Shinto doctrine.

The government would be in violation of Article 20 of the Constitution, which stipulates the separation of religion and state, if it forces Yasukuni Shrine as a religious corporation to enshrine the Class-A criminals separately. Proponents for separate enshrinement still exist within the ruling parties, claiming that such action could be taken once the plan has been discussed and approved by the shrine and relevant family members of those

Viewpoint: Japan plant - who is in charge?

By Yuki Tatsumi Stimson Center

As Japan works to recover from its greatest natural disaster in modern times, attention remains focused on the evolving situation at the crippled Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant.

Despite efforts by Tokyo Electric Power Company's (Tepco) engineers, the Self-Defence Forces, police and firemen, conditions there appear to have grown steadily worse.

On 1 April, Prime Minister Naoto Kan admitted that the plant had not yet been "sufficiently stabilised", acknowledging it would be a "long-term battle".

Since the beginning, one of the unanswered questions has been: "Who is in charge?"

A Japanese law laying out measures to be taken by the government in case of a nuclear energy disaster dictates that when a nuclear accident happens, an atomic power disaster response headquarters headed by the prime minister is to be established.

This ad hoc headquarters is expected to take charge of setting out the government's response and facilitating necessary inter-agency co-ordination within the government.

As the head of the disaster response headquarters, the prime minister has the authority to direct relevant government agencies as well as private companies that are involved in responding to the disaster.

He has two entities from which to draw expert opinions to assist him in decision-making: the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (Nisa, an agency within the Ministry of Economy, Industry and Trade (Meti)) and the Nuclear Safety Commission, an advisory panel made up of non-government experts.

So, legally speaking, the prime minister of Japan is in charge. Or he is supposed to be.

Advisers

So what of Mr Kan's leadership to date? On the one hand, it has been clear that he wants to appear in charge: he wanted to "speak directly to the Japanese people" in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake.

People in a temporary shelter in Fukushima prefecture watch Prime Minister Naoto Kan give an address on 15 March 2011

Mr Kan has made several addresses to the nation since the 11 March quake

He issued a press statement immediately after the disaster, and so far has made five televised addresses, most recently on 25 March. Four days after the quake, amid confusion over the situation at the plant, he was overheard by journalists asking Tepco executives: "What the hell is going on?"

Demonstrating his distrust in Tepco and Meti, he has appointed a number of non-government experts in addition to those who are already in advisory roles. As of 29 March, 5 out of 15 advisers were appointed specifically to advise on the situation at the plant.

Yet despite his efforts, as more time passes he appears less in charge. In terms of media questions, he has for the most part left the top government spokesman, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano, and Tepco executives in the hot seat.

Too many advisers around Mr Kan have created confusion in the communication process within government, making it harder, not easier, for him to make decisions.

Instead, we have witnessed finger-pointing, primarily at Tepco and also at Nisa. In fact, the idea of separating Nisa from Meti and making it an independent agency has already been floated as one of the lessons learned from the situation.

This is because the Kan government feels that Meti has been in too cosy a relationship with Tepco - to the extent that it has not exercised proper supervisory authority over the power giant and its response to the plant situation.

'Too big to fail'

Certainly, Tepco deserves the criticism that it has been receiving. For one thing, Tepco does not have a good record of managing nuclear accidents. Its responses to previous incidents have been severely criticised as "tardy" and "not forthcoming with timely information".

Aerial view of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant on 30 March 2011

Plant operator Tepco has come in for criticism over its handling of the situation

In 2002 it was also revealed that Tepco had been forging safety inspection records of some of its nuclear power plants. This time, Tepco has been severely criticised as it may have underestimated the gravity of the situation in the first several days.

In addition, it has been castigated by the government for not only not being forthcoming with critical radiation information, but also providing incorrect radiation readings from the plant.

As a power company with a monopoly in providing electricity to Tokyo and eight prefectures in eastern Japan, no one can deny that Tepco has been plagued with a "We are too big to fail" mentality, making it less proactive about emergency planning.

The decades-long tradition of close co-operation between big businesses and the government agencies that have regulatory and supervisory authority over them has certainly contributed to lapses in oversight.

It also, in part, has made the government dependent on these businesses for technical expertise.

Shut out

That said, Mr Kan's performance in responding to the accident at the plant is also illustrative of the fundamental problem in the governance style of his Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ).

The DPJ-led government was elected in August 2009, ending more than five decades of almost unbroken rule by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).

Even before this crisis hit, the DPJ's insistence on "leadership by politicians" - compared to the consensus, bottom-up style adopted by the LDP - had created problems.

The DPJ's deep mistrust in the bureaucracy has driven them to go outside existing government frameworks to look for solutions rather than attempting to effectively utilise the bureaucracy.

By alienating the bureaucracy in the decision-making process, the relationship between DPJ political leaders and the bureaucrats has been greatly soured. Its approach also prevented the DPJ from learning how to maximise bureaucrats' policy and technical expertise.

Given that the magnitude of the disaster that Mr Kan and his government face is unprecedented, there is no guarantee that an LDP government would have been able to respond to the crisis any better.

Even so, Mr Kan's instinct to look outside the government for counsel without tapping into the knowledge of the bureaucracy has created a situation in which he has essentially excluded the bureaucrats as a source of information.

This is critically disadvantageous, as the prime minister's chosen advisers - despite being experts in their field - will not have the same level of on-the-ground information.

Without better utilising the expertise that already exists in the bureaucracy, we will continue to see Mr Kan and his government fall behind the curve in its response.

Yuki Tatsumi is senior associate of the East Asia Programme at the Stimson Center, a Washington DC-based think-tank.